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DOMESTIC LAW CREATING INTERNATIONAL
REGIMES:
HOW LEGAL FORMALISM IS HOBBLING U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY
International law has always been contested. In recent years,
however, competition between States to influence the trajectory of
international law has intensified. Unfortunately, most
international lawyers and policy makers still employ an
impoverished understanding of the way in which international law
is created (i.e., through formal international negotiations or as
developed through custom). In this article, I argue that this
formalist perspective neglects the foundational role of domestic
lawmaking and regulation in the development of international law.
Indeed, this paper shows that domestic action has historically been
a direct causal antecedent to international legal regimes, and
concludes that States must fundamentally reconsider the
underpinnings of international law if they hope to effectively
advance their national interests in international politics.
These findings are born out through four case studies, which
analyze the development of international legal regimes for the
continental shelf, bribery of foreign officials, data privacy, and
artificial intelligence. In each case study, I apply an analytic model
rooted in Aristotelian understandings of causation, and expanded
upon through the constructivist legal literature. Throughout, the
paper provides concrete suggestions as to how States can reimagine their approach towards international law to better advance
their interests in the increasingly fragmented, yet still highly
interconnected, world of international politics.
Christopher Mirasola
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INTRODUCTION

International law is generally understood to be
created by treaty or custom developed over time and
adhered to out of a sense of international legal obligation.1

1 Or in more detail, as outlined by the Statute of the International Court
of Justice “1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a)
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international
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Formally, this may be the received wisdom. Practically, this
definition obscures much of what actually comes to
constitute international law. In this paper, I build on
scholarship regarding the diffusion and socialization of
international norms to argue that (1) domestic legal action
can be a tool for creating international legal regimes and,
therefore, (2) the foreign policy establishment should more
directly engage in domestic lawmaking to shape the
trajectory of international law.
Legal formalism fundamentally informs the U.S.
foreign
policy
establishment’s
understanding
of
international law. Take, for example, the development of
norms for State conduct in cyberspace. In 2004, the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly established a Group of
Governmental Experts tasked with considering “existing
and potential threats in the field of information security, as
well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging in
this field.” 2 This group held five sessions from 2004 to 2017,
two of which ended with consensus reports on international
law regarding operations in cyberspace. 3 In the summer of

custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.” Statute of the International Court of
Justice art. 38, ¶1, June 26, 1945, 33 U.S.T. 993.
2 G.A. Res. A/Res/59/61, at 2 (Dec. 16, 2004),
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/59/
61.
3 Ann Valjataga, Back to Square One? The Fifth UN GGE Fails to Submit a
Conclusive Report at the UN General Assembly, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER
DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (Sept 1, 2017), https://ccdcoe.org/back-
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2017, however, the Group was unable to agree on (1) the
right of response to internationally wrongful acts, (2) the
right to self-defense, and (3) the applicability of the laws of
war to cyber operations. 4 Reactions to this failure reflect the
extent to which legal formalism dominates in the foreign
policy establishment. Ann Valjiataga at NATO’s cyber
center, for example, wrote that, “The reasons for the failure
undermine the very foundations of any meaningful legal
debate over international cyber security.” 5 She went on to
conclude that, “norm-based universal consensus has worked
for nuclear disarmament but proven to be a rocky road in
almost all other fields, and cyber is no exception.” 6 Michael
Schmitt and Liis Vihul similarly noted that, “Since no
international lawyer can, in 2017, deny [international law’s]
applicability to cyber activities, the failure of the GGE
[Group of Governmental Experts] can only be interpreted as
the intentional politicization in the cyber context of wellaccepted international norms.” 7 Michele Markoff, then U.S.
Deputy Coordinator for Cyber Issues, remarked that, “our
work has been in vain” and that “this is particularly
disappointing given the work this Group has done . . . to
reach common understandings on the implementation of
stabilizing measures, including voluntary, non-binding

square-one-fifth-un-gge-fails-submit-conclusive-report-un-generalassembly.html.
4 Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN
GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, JUST SECURITY (June 30 2017),
https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/international-cyber-lawpoliticized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/.
5 Valjataga, supra note 3.
6 Id.
7 Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 4.
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norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace.” 8 More
recently, UN Secretary General António Guterres told the
Munich Security conference that, “It’s high time to have a
serious discussion about the international legal framework
in which cyberwars take place.” 9 Taking on this charge, Tim
Mauer and Kathryn Taylor outline only three options –
restarting the Group process, negotiating a Digital Geneva
Convention, or negotiating more tailored bilateral or
multilateral agreements. 10
Setting the necessity and utility of establishing
international norms for State conduct in cyberspace aside, 11

U.S. Dep’t of State, Explanation of Position at the Conclusion of the
2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of
International Security, remarks by the Department of State
Deputy_Coordinator_for_Cyber_Issues_(June_23,_2017),
https://www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/releasesandremarks/272175.htm
.
9 U.N. Secretary-General, Address at the Opening Ceremony of the
Munich Security Conference
(Feb._16,_2018),_https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/20
18-02-16/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-address-opening-ceremonymunich-security.
10 Tim Maurer & Kathryn Taylor, Outlook on International Cyber Norms:
Three Avenues for Future Progress, JUST SECURITY (March 2, 2018),
https://www.justsecurity.org/53329/outlook-international-cybernorms-avenues-future-progress/.
11 Others have argued, for example, that, “the GGE put the cart before
the horse by calling for an affirmation of legal principles without
detailing them or understanding their consequences for military
strategies.” Arun Sukumar, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in
Cyberspace Doomed As Well?, LAWFAREBLOG (July 4 2017),
https://lawfareblog.com/un-gge-failed-international-law-cyberspacedoomed-well. Others have also argued that, “Beijing [widely understood
to have been one of the recalcitrant States, along with Russia and Cuba]
8
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these statements and proposals reveal a common
presumption that formal negotiations are the only
meaningful route towards creating international norms and
law. By stepping away from this formalistic view, however,
we can see that such a perspective is at least
counterintuitive. Why is it that norms can only be
meaningfully developed in formal multilateral fora? The
literature on norms diffusion certainly does not make this
presumption. Yet it remains widely held. Brad Smith,
President and Chief Legal Officer at Microsoft, for example,
has called on States to negotiate a Digital Geneva
Convention to “protect[] civilians from nation-state attacks
in times of peace.” 12 State and non-governmental
organization (NGO) efforts to address (or ban) lethal
autonomous weapon systems have focused almost
exclusively on multilateral negotiations within the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. 13 This

has never liked the idea that international law applies to cyberspace, and
began walking back the 2013 report almost as soon as the ink was dry.”
Adam Segal, The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in
Deadlock.
Now_What?,_COUNCIL_ON_FOREIGN_RELATIONS_(June_29,_2017),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/development-cyber-norms-united-nationsends-deadlock-now-what.
12 Brad Smith, The need for a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT ON THE
ISSUES
(Feb.
14
2017),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-theissues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/.
13 See, e.g., Killer robots: World's top AI and robotics companies urge United
Nations to ban lethal autonomous weapons, MEDIANET (Aug. 21 2017),
http://www.medianet.com.au/releases/141447/; See also, Josh Dorsin,
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Statement on the way forward - STATEMENT BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AT THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL
WEAPONS GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON LETHAL
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consistent assumption that only international, formal
processes can create international rules of the road
needlessly restricts a State’s ability to advance its national
interests.
Before outlining the rest of this paper, a quick note to
clarify my argument. I am not arguing that an enactment of
domestic law, alone, can formally bind other States.
Domestic law, alone, creates neither conventional nor
customary international law. 14 I am arguing, instead, that the
formalist vision of international law entirely misses the
point. States create international legal regimes to advance
national interests and further a given set of values. When
policymakers want to develop international law, they are
saying that an issue set exists for which present practices
insufficiently advance national interests. Domestic law, even
and especially when not grounded in existing international
law or practice, can advance national interests in the
international arena. Stated another way, domestic legislative
enactments can have a first mover effect on the creation of
international
legal
regimes.
Formal
international
negotiations are needed to make these new practices (more)
binding, but they are not required to establish those new
practices in the first instance.
Perhaps unwittingly, the United States has used
domestic law in the creation of many international legal

AUTONOMOUS+WEAPONS+SYSTEMS+(Nov.+17+2017),
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2017/11/17/ccw-gge-meeting-on-lawsu-s-statement-on-the-way-forward/.
14 Of course, domestic law enacted pursuant to a sense of international
legal obligation would be evidence of customary international law. Here,
however, we are dealing with circumstances in which the concerned
State does not believe that there is an applicable rule of international law.
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regimes. I will highlight two examples in this paper: (1) the
effect of Harry Truman’s 1945 Presidential Proclamation on
the creation of a regime for the continental shelf in the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and (2) the
effect of Congress passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) on the creation of the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (Bribery Convention).
Both cases begin with domestic legal enactments not
grounded in a sense of international legal obligation. Those
domestic legal enactments meaningfully advanced the
creation of a formal international legal regime, subsequently
formalized through international negotiation. They differ in
the extent to which they have been generalized globally.
UNCLOS, as a comprehensive set of legal regimes governing
maritime activities during peacetime, entered into force in
1994 and is adhered to by 168 States Parties. 15 The OECD
Bribery Convention entered into force in 1999 and is adhered
to by 43 countries. 16 A historic analysis of each case will
show that domestic policymakers should more seriously
consider using domestic legal instruments in the creation of
international legal regimes.
Part I begins by outlining the definitions, assumptions, and
theory underpinning my analysis. As Keohane and Nye
once remarked, “theory is inescapable . . .. Pragmatic
policymakers may think that they need pay no more heed to

15 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 76(1), Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
16 OECD, OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC
OFFICIALS+IN+INTERNATIONAL+BUSINESS+TRANSACTIONS+(2018),
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm.
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theoretical disputes over the nature of world politics than
they pay to medieval scholastic disputes over how many
angels can dance on the head of a pin. Academic pens,
however, leave marks in the minds of statesmen with
profound results for policy.” 17 In this spirit, Part I clarifies
key terms interchangeably and often imprecisely used in the
policy, and academic, communities. I then briefly outline my
assumptions regarding the nature of international politics
before explaining the causal mechanisms by which domestic
law creates international legal regimes. Part II then shows
how the historic record supports my causal theory. I first
present the continental shelf and FCPA case studies before
taking on contemporaneous examples – data privacy and
artificial intelligence (AI). Based on this analysis, Part III
concludes by providing policy recommendations for the U.S.
government, though many of these lessons can be
generalized to other States.
II.

DEFINITIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND CAUSAL THEORY
a. DEFINING KEY TERMS

Scholars of international relations and international law
use a dizzying amount of jargon. All too often, the terms
used lack rigorous meaning. For example, international
regimes have been notably defined as “sets of implicit or
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a

ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE:
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 4 (2d ed. 1989).
17
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given area of international relations.” 18 But what
differentiates principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures? Indeed, on the next page the author admits that
“The rules of a regime are difficult to distinguish from its
norms; at the margin, they merge into one another.” 19 Yet
another page later the conceptual picture gets more
confused, “Principles, norms, rules, and procedures all
contain injunctions about behavior; they prescribe certain
actions and proscribe others.” 20 Unanswered, however, is
why we would use so many different terms to refer to the
same conceit.
Drawing largely from constructivist literature, I will
instead use three terms – agents, rules, and regimes. Agents
are entities that “act in society to achieve goals.” 21 They both
observe patterns of behavior and, if existing patterns of
behavior are disadvantageous, “will act to change them.”22
In the international arena, these agents include “individuals
and a variety of functional groups, as well as national and

ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN
(1984).
19 Id., at 58. Keohane goes on to argue that “Rules are, however, more
specific; they indicate in more detail the specific rights and obligations of
members.” This distinction, however, is largely unhelpful. How much
more specific? Need rules be technical? Can we say that there is an
international norm against female genital mutilation, or is this too
concrete?
20 Id., at 59.
21 NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, Constructivism, in MAKING SENSE
MAKING WORLDS 5, (2013).
22 Id., at 6.
18

THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 57
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subnational units.” 23 Neoclassical realists, and the realist
tradition more broadly, “posits that territorial states are the
primary units in the international system.” 24 While I do not
presume an equality of capacity or importance between
agents, especially regarding national security, I include nonState actors and supranational organizations in my analysis.
Rules are “statements that tell people what we should
do.” 25 This more general definition encompasses both
“norms” and formal legal rules – both of which exist on a
spectrum of formality and bindingness. As more agents
adhere to a particular rule, it becomes normatively
stronger. 26 There are incentives for rules to become
formalized through the legal process – legally constituted
rules more clearly identify “what the rules are, how much
they matter to other agents, and what consequences they can
expect from not following them.” 27 While this distinction
between more and less formal rules may be important in
international politics, it is less important when thinking
about the diffusion of patterns of behavior (which in much
of the literature is called norms diffusion). It is important to
note that, for constructivists, rules and agents are mutually
constitutive. Onuf argues that, “rules tell us who the active
participants in a society are. Constructivists call these

K.J HOLSTI, Change in the International System: Interdependence,
Integration, and Fragmentation” in CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
25 (Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson, & Alexander George, eds. 1991).
24
NORRIN RIPSMAN, JEFFREY TALIAFERRO, & STEVEN LOBELL,
NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 35 (2016).
25 Onuf, supra note 21, at 4.
26 Id., at 13.
27 Id. Emphasis omitted.
23
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participants agents.” 28 This seemingly metaphysical insight is
actually quite intuitive. Women, as political agents in
American politics, were simultaneously redefined by the 19th
Amendment and essential to the creation and passage of the
19th Amendment.
Finally, “families of rules and related practices [are often
called] regimes.” 29 Regimes are typically organized around a
certain set of issues, on the theory that the issues are “so
closely linked that they should be dealt with together.”30
They can be more or less stable, though regimes are never
fixed. 31 Agents cannot entirely control the nature of regimes
through their constituent rules – “unintended consequences
frequently form stable patterns with respect to their effect on
agents.” 32
Armed with this lexicon, I’ll restate the thesis. Agents in
international politics, and States in particular, can constitute
international regimes, on any given issue, by creating rules
at the domestic level. As will be shown below, this causal
chain is always contested – regimes are never fixed. And not
all agents will be equally empowered in the creation of
international regimes – the rules of international law
empower, for example, States over even the most well
endowed multinational corporations. Before getting too far

Id., at 4.
Id., at 13.
30 KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 61.
31 ONUF, supra note 21 at 5.
32 Id., at 6. Onuf takes the example of the price of a commodity in a
perfect market. Based on a particular set of rules, and given an
adequately large number of agents, any one agent loses the ability to set
price in the market.
28
29
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into this analysis, a few comments on the assumptions I
make about the nature of international politics.
b. ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

THE

INTERNATIONAL

As a baseline, I assume that uncertainty pervades
international politics. 33 This includes uncertainty about the
intentions of other agents, the actions other agents might
take, their present and future capacity, etc. Notwithstanding
this uncertainty, the post-Cold War world has become
strikingly interdependent. Keohane and Nye provide a
useful framework for understanding this complex
interdependence. First, multiple channels connect societies,
from formal relations between States to less formal contacts
between transnational organizations. 34 Importantly, there is
considerable variability in the extent to which individual
agents are connected. A State’s degree of connectivity is
correlated with its vulnerability or sensitivity to actions
taken by other international agents. 35 Second, there is an
“absence of hierarchy among issues.” 36 This means both that
(1) military security is not always the most important issue
for a State and (2) military power will not always be
determinative in advancing a State’s interests.37

KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 257.
KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 26.
35 Id., at 12. This dichotomy between sensitivity and interdependence will
be discussed at greater length in the next subsection.
36 Id., at 25.
37 Keohane and Nye also present a third pillar of complex
interdependence – that “military force is not used by governments
toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, where
33
34
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Interdependence in an uncertain world is not necessarily
beneficial. As Holsti notes, “increased transaction flows can
lead to dependency, exploitation, conflict, and violence as
well as to more collaboration and mutual knowledge.” 38 In
this regard, I do not deviate too far from the realist tradition,
which sees international politics as being characterized by
anarchy. 39
International law cannot be separated from the
political realities of this international environment. Hans
Morgenthau, who trained first as a lawyer, was critical of socalled legalism, “the artificial separation of the juridical
sphere from not just the normative spheres of mores and
morals considerations, but also of all insights from the social
sciences and psychology.” 40 So while I acknowledge that
international relations is a legal (or at least rule-infused)
environment,41 we must be cognizant of the political
conditions within which any international regime exists. 42
c. CAUSATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

complex interdependence prevails.” Id. While the first two pillars, noted
above, are assumptions of complex interdependence, this third pillar is
more of a conclusion. As such, I do not use it to describe my
understanding of international politics.
38 Holsti, supra note 23, at 28.
39 Jack Snyder, Introduction: New Thinking About the New International
System, in COPING WITH COMPLEXITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 11
(Jack Snyder & Robert Jervis, eds. 1993) (characterizing Waltz’s theory of
structural realism).
40 OLIVER JÜTERSONKE, MORGENTHAU, LAW AND REALISM 146 (2010).
41 ONUF, supra note 21, at 13.
42 JÜTERSONKE, supra note 40, at 159.
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I take what Milja Kurki calls a critical realist approach
to causation (notwithstanding the fact that the roots of this
approach are primarily Aristotelian). Kurki finds that most
social science scholarship treats “ideas, rules, norms and
discourse as non-causal.” 43 This understanding of cause is
unduly narrow, particularly in the study of international
relations, where observation and controlled experimentation
to determine that A action produces B outcome is
exceedingly difficult. Instead, Kurki explains that, “certain
aspects of the Aristotelian account of causation can be useful
in elucidating the nature of different senses in which we
might apply the concept of cause.” 44 A few notes of caution
before we proceed. For Aristotle, causation was an expansive
concept – objects as well as events had causes. 45 Indeed,
Aristotle’s understanding of cause was more akin to our
understanding of explanation – why something is the way it
is. 46 In Physics, Aristotle identifies four types of cause:
(1) Material Cause – “that out of which a thing comes to be
and which persists” (e.g., the bronze of a bronze statute);
(2) Formal Cause – “the form or the archetype, i.e. the
statement of the essence, and its genera” (e.g., schematics for
the statute);
(3) Effective Cause – “the primary source of the change or
coming to rest” (e.g., the sculptor who makes the statute);
and

MILJA KURKI, CAUSATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: RECLAIMING
CAUSAL ANALYSIS 12 (2008).
44 Id., at 13.
45 S. Marc Cohen, The Four Causes, THE UNIV OF WASHINGTON (Sept. 23,
2016), https://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/4causes.htm.
46 Mindful of this distinction, I will continue to use the word “cause” for
the sake of simplicity.
43
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(4) Final Cause – “the sense of end or ‘that for the sake of
which’ a thing is done” (e.g., the sculptor’s intent in creating
the statute). 47
Let’s put it more simply. The material cause is the
tangible factors out of which something is constituted, those
parameters which enable and constrain action. 48 The formal
cause is definitional – the set of rules that give meaning to
some end product. 49 The effective cause is closest to what we
usually call causation – it is the action undertaken to actually
craft the end product. 50 The final cause is intent – the
subjective purpose for which the end product is made. 51
Much of the existing literature on causation in
international law comprehends aspects of critical realist
causation, though not in these terms. The remainder of this
subsection expands on each of these four causes, and their
treatment (or lack thereof) in traditional international law
scholarship.
The material cause, for our purposes, is those factors
that enable and constrain action. In one sense, this can be
understood as the attributes of national power. These
attributes are emphasized most prominently in the realist
tradition.52 Kenneth Waltz, the father of structural realism, is

47ARISTOTLE,

PHYSICS, (RP Hardie & RK Gaye trans., MIT),
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html.
48 KURKI, supra note 43, at 27.
49 Id.; Cohen, supra note 45.
50 KURKI, supra note 43, at 27.
51 Id.
52 Other scholarly traditions also consider material factors, though they
are less likely to use these factors as deterministically. For example, Dina
Zinnes noted that the most important “composite” variable for
understanding change in the international system is the “number of
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famous for arguing that the relative distribution of
capabilities among units is the primary causal variable of
international politics. 53 Typically, capability (and therefore
power) is understood to include a State’s Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), levels of annual defense spending, the size
and composition of its armed forces, military research and
development, population (and other demographic trends),
natural resource endowments, and geography.54 These
capabilities are seen as most important in understanding
“the range of possible bargaining outcomes among states.” 55
If one were looking to understand the series of unequal
treaties negotiated between the late Qing Dynasty and
western powers (e.g., the United Kingdom and France) from
the perspective of material causation, for example, one
would focus on their military technical advantage and
economic leverage, particularly through the opium trade.
Other scholars have usefully complicated this
straightforward notion of material cause. Holsti, for

nations within the system and the distribution of power over those
nations.” Dina Zinnes, Prerequisites for the Study of System Transformation,
in CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 9 (Ole Holsti, Randolph
Siverson, & Alexander George eds., 1991). Keohane similarly stated that,
“we should focus first on the [material] constraints imposed on actors
before examining their choices.” KEOHANE, supra note 19 at 71. Keohane
and Nye remarked that, “The structure of the system (the distribution of
power resources among states) profoundly affects the nature of the
[international] regime (the more or less loose set of formal and informal
norms, rules, and procedures relevant to the [international] system” and
“Changes in regime reflect shifts in the distribution of power within the
issue area.” KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 21 & 137.
53 RIPSMAN, TALIAFERRO, & LOBELL, supra note 24, at 38.
54 Id., at 43.
55 Id.
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example, argues that other agents’ perception of a State’s
capabilities is important in the definition of those same
capabilities. 56 Similarly, Kurki cautions that material
resources should “not . . . be understood in a mere military
sense,” but also “recognised as constituted through social
processes involving social actors and socialising principles
(formal causes).” 57 Given the fact that military might will not
be uniformly dispositive across issue areas, it is important to
be mindful of elements of national power less emphasized in
the realist tradition (e.g., soft power).
In another sense, material causation includes the
degree to which an agent is linked to other agents. As noted
above, agents in international politics are not equally
connected to each other. From the perspective of regime
creation, one agent’s connection to other agents can have
both negative and positive effects. 58 On the one hand, more
links to other agents present more avenues through which
an agent might instantiate its preferred set of rules. On the
other hand, more links can increase an agent’s sensitivity
(responsiveness) to changes wrought by other agents. 59

Dina Zinnes, supra note 52, at 12. Keohane also highlights the
importance of perception. He argues that “actors subject to bounded
rationality cannot maximize in the classical sense, because they are not
capable of using all the information that is potentially available.”
KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 111–12.
57 KURKI, supra note 44, at 238.
58 For an example in the human rights framework, Goodman and Jinks
argue that after a certain quantity of links are made “domestic political
authorities [may] abjure international [human rights] norms and refrain
from participation in international [human rights] organizations.” RYAN
GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (2013).
59 KEOHANE, supra note 19, at 12.
56
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Keohane and Nye also argue that an agent highly sensitive
to change will not necessarily be vulnerable to that change,
so long as there are sufficient internal protections to mitigate
costs or propose less burdensome alternatives. 60 An agent’s
internal protections, again, are tied to its material
capabilities.
The formal cause posits that ideas and rules “define
or constitute meaning.” 61 Dominant ways of conceiving an
issue “come to inform the intentions and the actions of
agents, that is, the meanings that constitute social life
‘condition’ agents’ intentions and actions.” 62 This is
consonant with the constructivist perspective, which
highlights the importance of language in constituting the
social world. 63 Kurki is quick to point out that formal causes
do not directly bring about a particular effect – they
“condition” and “shape” social practices. 64 This distinction is
what separates the critical realist understanding of formal
cause from most of the existing literature. Take, for example,

KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 18, at 13.
KURKI, supra note 43, at 224.
62 Id.
63
ADRIANA SINCLAIR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL APPROACH 8 (2010). There is, however,
an important philosophical difference between the constructivist and
critical realist perspectives. For constructivists, discourses themselves
constitute the objects that are observed – the objects have no definition
outside changing discourses. KURKI, supra note 43 at 203. Critical realists,
however, accept that there is something real that is being perceived,
independent of a given discourse. Instead, “they argue that concepts,
meanings and rules also give rise to materially unfolding structures of
social relations, that is, they give rise to materially embodied ‘internal
relations’ between agents.” Id., at 210.
64 Id., at 224–25.
60
61
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Keohane and Nye’s discussion of unilateral initiative, a
mechanism for changing regimes by which “large state[s]
may not be able or willing to police the behavior of other
states, but because of [their] size and importance, [their]
actions may determine the regimes that govern situations of
interdependence, both because of its direct effects and
through imitation.” 65 One example of Keohane and Nye’s
unilateral initiative would be the fact that China established,
in 1998, the Chinese Center for Disease Control (CDC),
patterned almost exactly on the U.S. CDC. 66 Within our
framework, this proposition blends material, formal, and
effective cause. A States’ size and importance is given causal
effect (material cause – or in our CDC example, the United
States’ position as a leading authority in public health). They
also intimate that “direct” tools are used to coerce
compliance (effective cause – while it’s unclear whether the
U.S. coerced compliance, there are pressures to create
institutions that can easily liaise with international
counterparts). The closest Keohane and Nye get to the
formal clause is by positing that other agents may imitate the
larger State’s new pattern of behavior. Issue definition is a
necessary predicate to imitation. So, in a way, the formal
cause underpins this entire causal chain. But even imitation
is blended with the effective cause, insofar as other agents
have to engage in a process of learning. 67

KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 230.
China CDC, INT’L ASSOC. OF NAT’L PUB. HEALTH INST.,
http://www.ianphi.org/membercountries/memberinformation/china.
html.
67 Ernst Haas’ writing on learning underscores why it should be
understood as an effective cause. He argues that when learning occurs
“new knowledge is used to redefine the content of the national interest.
65
66
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Hints of critical realism can be seen in Goodman and
Jinks’ work on the promotion of human rights through
international law. Goodman and Jinks identify three
mechanisms for influencing a State’s human rights practice –
material inducement, persuasion, and acculturation. 68 In
material inducement, “actors are influenced to change their
behavior by the imposition of material costs or the conferral
of material benefits.” 69 This is a blending of the material and
effective causes – the instruments of State power are used to
coerce compliance, even if compliance does not accord with
a State’s perception of its own interests. 70 Persuasion is
similar to Keohane and Nye’s understanding of learning, as
“target actors are convinced of the truth, validity, or
appropriateness of a norm, belief, or practice.” 71 Unlike
Keohane and Nye, however, Goodman and Jinks are more
explicit about the formal causality embedded in this process.
They argue that persuasion occurs through framing
(increasing the extent to which a practice resonates with
already accepted norms) and cuing (providing new
information, which forces an agent to rethink a prior
position). Both of these processes are definitional, and
therefore examples of formal causation. Goodman and Jinks
get the closest to approximating the formal cause through
what they term acculturation, “the general process by which
actors adopt the beliefs and behavior patterns of the

Awareness of newly understood causes of unwanted effects usually
result in the adoption of different, and more effective, means to attain
one’s ends.” KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 264–65.
68 GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 58, at 2.
69 Id., at 22.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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surrounding culture. . . . this mechanism induces behavioral
changes through pressures to assimilate—some imposed by
other actors and some imposed by the self.” 72 Acculturation
relies on changed definitions, but is understood by the
authors as much more direct than critical realists would
believe the formal cause to be. 73 An example of acculturation
they point out is the fact that the number of constitutions
specifically providing for a right to education increased
dramatically throughout the 19th century with no
concomitant increase in local social organizations pushing
for such a right. 74
Before considering the effective cause, it is important
to note that this blending of causes is not necessarily
problematic – all social outcomes have multiple causes
within the critical realist framework. Kurki notes that “in
practice different causes often ‘mesh together’ or
‘coincide.’” 75 Nevertheless, it is useful to more precisely
understand the pathways through which these effects are
produced.
The efficient cause has been most completely
addressed by the academic and policy communities.
Strategies that call for enrolling allies into decision-making

Id., at 4.
For example, Goodman and Jinks argue that this framework can be
used to “generat[e] concrete, empirically falsifiable propositions about
the role of the international legal regime in transforming state
preferences and behaviors.” Id., at 3. A Humean understanding of that is
at least in tension with the more metaphysical understanding of cause
advanced by Aristotle.
74 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 649–50 (Dec. 2004).
75 KURKI, supra note 43, at 28 & 227.
72
73
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processes are examples of thinking in terms of efficient
causation (doing x to create y effect). 76 So too is imposing
“negative as well as positive inducements.” 77 For example,
think of a State providing defense materiel in exchange for a
security partner adhering to the laws of war as that partner
fights against an insurgent group. The final cause, on the
other hand, has been less completely appreciated as an
independent source of causation. It posits that agents’
intentions, and other agents’ perception of an agents’
intentions, have real causal power. 78 This type of causal
effect can be seen when Keohane and Nye, for example,
argue that unilateralism “disrupt[s] cooperation in
international relationship and cast[s] doubt on American
motivations . . . such approaches may destroy the basis for
legitimate international regimes.” 79
d. CRITICAL REALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

THE

DOMESTIC ROOTS

OF

I argue that critical realist causation best explains how
domestic legal action can create international legal regimes.
While all four types of causation will play a role in the case
studies presented in Part II, formal causation is the key to
many of these stories. Indeed, it is the underappreciated,
independent causal effect of ideas and rules that may largely
account for the fact that foreign policymakers neglect

KEOHANE , supra note 18, at 34.
Id., at 53 & 79. Note that, as stated above, this also includes leveraging
capabilities, and therefore is blended with material causation.
78 KURKI, supra note 43, at 217 & 226.
79 KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 236.
76
77
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domestic policy tools. Before using this framework to
advance my thesis, a few implications of this theory should
be noted.
First, the concept of a formal cause implies that rules
are inherently political. By this I mean that rules necessarily
advance particular interests, and embody a particular set of
values. This harkens back to Morgenthau’s critiques of
legalism as the “instrumentalization of a formalistic
conception of law by political powers that seek to clothe
their aspirations in the language of universality.” 80 This
should not be surprising. Rules created by one agent
necessarily limit the freedom of other agents. 81 While
policymakers working on behalf of current hegemons may
profit from speaking about law apolitically, to create new
rules thinking in the same terms is entirely to their
detriment.
Second, and furthermore, the fact that rules
instantiate values means that rules also instantiate a
particular hierarchy of power and influence. 82 Onuf
recognized that “starting with rules, as constructivists often
do, leads quickly enough to patterns of relations that we can
only describe as a condition of rule.” 83 He goes on to say that
while rules appear to rule, “agents actually do the ruling by
getting other agents to accept their ideas and beliefs. They
do so by example and indoctrination. Rule in this form is
hegemony.” 84 Again, this fact can be lost on States that have

JÜTERSONKE, supra note 40, at 147–48 & 173.
ONUF, supra note 21, at 9.
82 SINCLAIR, supra note 63, at 18.
83 ONUF, supra note 21, at 7.
84 Id., at 18.
80
81
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grown comfortable in their hegemonic status. Hegemony in
any given issue space is an inherently contested and political
status. Efforts to maintain, or gain, hegemony will then
necessarily be focused on the contest of ideas (a battle of
formal causation).
Third, formal causation suggests that there are
substantial benefits to being the first agent to define a given
issue space. Finnemore and Sikkink, for example, identified
a three-stage cycle for norm creation – emergence,
acceptance, and internalization. 85 For our purposes, norm
emergence is important insofar as Finnemore and Sikkink
note the role of “norm entrepreneurs,” agents that call
attention to or create issues through the “construction of
cognitive frames.”86 The degree to which a norm
entrepreneur (or in our lexicon, a rule entrepreneur) is
effective in instantiating a particular norm (rule) will depend
on the other patterns of causation noted above. Again, it is
important reiterate Finnemore and Sikkink’s reminder that
this is always a contested process – “new norms [rules]
never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a
highly contested normative space where they must compete
with other norms and perceptions of interest.” 87 Causation,
therefore, is not unidirectional – regimes once created
remain contestable.
Fourth, and last, this framework does not assume that
any given cause will have an a priori knowable effect.
Unintended consequences are inherent to any activity in an

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics
and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 4 895, 887–915 (1998).
86 Id.
87 Id., at 897.
85
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international environment characterized by uncertainty.88
Jervis argues that unintended consequences stem from two
sources – (1) the fact that “outcomes are often produced
through a chain of actions and reactions” and (2) “the result
of trying to move directly toward a goal may be movement
in the opposite direction.” 89 As to this second point,
Keohane and Nye note that, “strategies of manipulating
interdependence are likely to lead to counterstrategies.”90
This again raises issues of perception and intent (even in the
creation, or redefinition, of ideas).
III.

CASE STUDIES

Substantively, the continental shelf, international
corruption, data privacy, and AI have little in common. The
international legal regimes that have developed (or are
coming into being) around them, however, raise similar
critical realist insights. First, in each case a rule entrepreneur
redefined an issue by unilaterally establishing domestic law
and/or policy that would powerfully influence positive
international law (again, noting that this process has not yet
been completed in the case of data privacy and AI). Second,
in each case this redefinition sparked counter-strategies from
agents whose interests diverged from that of the rule

KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 10–11.
Robert Jervis, Systems and Interaction Effects, in COPING WITH
COMPLEXITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 31 (Jack Snyder & Robert
Jervis eds., 1993).
90 KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 16. Of course, the degree of risk that
military counterstrategies will occur depends on the interests and
consequences at stake in a given example of international regime
creation.
88
89
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entrepreneur. These unintended consequences shaped the
contours of the eventual international legal regime – not
always in ways agreeable to the rule entrepreneur. Lastly,
and nevertheless, the rule entrepreneur’s interests are better
advanced by taking action than they would have been if the
agent had insisted on formal, international processes from
the very beginning. I do not mean to suggest that this will
always be the case – a critical realist approach to foreign
policy must be attuned to context. And as will be shown in
the case of the continental shelf, domestic action taken out of
short-term interest can be coopted by rivals to advance
international rules at odds with the rule entrepreneur’s longterm interests. But this should at least indicate the utility of
domestic action as an opening gambit in the creation of
international legal regimes. For each of the following cases, I
first provide a narrative historical overview of the issue
before applying the critical realist framework.
a. CONSTITUTING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
Maritime law is defined by the tension between State
sovereignty and free access to the sea and its resources. This
tension was most plainly laid bare by a pair of texts
published in the 1600s. Hugo Grotius’ Mare Liberum,
published in 1609 on behalf of the Dutch East India
Company, argued that, “Every nation is free to travel to
every other nation, and to trade with it” as a matter of
natural law. 91 John Selden, responding in support of British

HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: OR THE RIGHT WHICH
BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 7 (James
91
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claims to maritime sovereignty in 1652, argued instead that,
“the SEA, by the LAVV OF NATURE, or NATIONS is not
common to all men, but capable of PRIVATE DOMINION or
Proprietie, as well as the LAND.” 92
The legal history of the continental shelf is yet another
instantiation of this age-old debate between Grotius and
Selden. In the modern law of the sea, UNCLOS Part VI
governs the continental shelf. It provides that the continental
shelf:
comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas that extend beyond [a coastal
State’s] territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance
of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that
distance. 93
Over this land mass, “the coastal State exercises . . .
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources.” 94 This is an exclusive right,
“if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or
exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these

Brown Scott ed., Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans., 2001) (“licere cuivis
genti quamvis alteram adire, cumque ea negotiari”).
92 JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM SEU (Marchmont Nedham trans., 1652),
available at
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A59088.0001.001/1:2?rgn=div1;vie
w=fulltext.
93 UNCLOS art. 76(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
94 Id. at Art 77(1).
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activities without the express consent of the coastal State.”95
These provisions have real weight. In 2007, 14% of the
United States’ natural gas and 27% of its oil production were
derived from drilling on its continental shelf. 96 When the
United States laid claim to the continental shelf, thenSecretary of the Interior Harold Ickles stated that, “the
Continental Shelf ranks with the lands which we acquired by
the Louisiana Purchase, or by the opening of the West, or by
the purchase of Alaska.” 97
UNCLOS’ articulation of a State’s rights to the
continental shelf was taken almost verbatim from the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. 98 This is

Id. at Art 77(2).
U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, RESOURCES OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL
SHELF - REMARK BY THE DIRECTOR OF OFFSHORE ENERGY AND MINERALS
MANAGEMENT, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, March 17 2009,
https://www.doi.gov/ocl/hearings/111/ResoursesOnTheOCS_031709.
97 Harold Ickles, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior (1945), 40
LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS VOLUME I, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951).
98 Article 2 of the Geneva Convention provided that “The coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources” and that these rights
“are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the
continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake
these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the
express consent of the coastal State.” Convention on the Continental
Shelf art. 2, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. This is almost
identical to language in UNCLOS Article 77(1–2). The two conventions
differ primarily in their definition of the outer boundary of the
continental shelf (compare, for example, UNCLOS Art 76 with Geneva
Convention Art 1). This was largely due to technological developments
that had expanded the depths of the sea amenable to exploitation and
General Assembly resolutions calling for the resources of the deep
95
96
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particularly striking given that it was only in 1945, thirteen
years before this Convention was signed, that President
Harry Truman first introduced the concept of the continental
shelf. The remainder of this subsection will describe
Truman’s Presidential Proclamation, outline other States’
reactions to it, and explain why it can be seen as the cause of
today’s regime for the continental shelf.
b. HARRY TRUMAN’S PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
Proclamation 2667 on the “Policy of the United States
with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea
Bed of the Continental Shelf” stated for the first time that
“the United States regards the natural resources of the
subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as
appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction

seabed to be mined for the “benefit of all mankind.” DONALD ROTHWELL
& TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 112 (2d ed., 2016).
These policy imperatives required a new formula for defining the outer
limits of the continental shelf. A number of alternatives were considered
throughout the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. Third U.N.
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Preliminary study illustrating various
formulae for the definition of the continental shelf, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.98 and Add.1-3 (Official Records of the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume IX) (April 18, 1978),
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../diplomaticconferences/1973_los/do
cs/english/vol_9/a_conf62_c2_l98_and_add1_3.pdf&lang=E.
The
Conference’s Second Committee eventually settled on a more
geologically-based formula that left open the possibility of national
entitlements beyond 200 nautical miles. ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra
note 98 at 113.

2018

DOMESTIC LAW, INT’L REGIMES

31

and control.” 99 This extension of jurisdiction was not
grounded in any international legal right. Instead, President
Truman argued that, “the exercise of jurisdiction over the
natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the
continental shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable and
just” and that “the continental shelf may be regarded as an
extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus
naturally appurtenant to it.”100
In these few short paragraphs we can identify three
causes of the incipient continental shelf regime. First, there is
a recognition of material cause – advances in technology
transformed this submarine area into a monetizable
resource. 101 Changing technology lifted constraints on the
extent to which a State might plausibly assert rights to this
vast undersea area and its resources. Other States, also
forwarding a variety of claims to the continental shelf,
would point out this same change in circumstances. 102

Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Sept. 28, 1945).
Id.
101 U.S. Press Release accompanying the proclamation (“The rapid
development of technical knowledge and equipment occasioned by the
war now makes possible the determination of the resources of the
submerged lands outside the three-mile limit.”). Harry Truman,
Concerning the Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf (1945), 39 LAWS
AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS VOLUME I, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951).
102 Saudi Arabia noted that, “by God’s providence valuable resources
may underlie parts of the Persian Gulf off the coasts of Saudi Arabia, and
that modern technology by the grace of God makes it increasingly
practicable to utilize these resources.” Abdul’Aziz ibn’Abdul Rahman Al
Faisal Al Sa’ud, Royal Pronouncement Concerning the Policy of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia with Respect to the Subsoil and Sea Bed of Areas in the Persian
99

100
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Second, Proclamation 2667 is quite explicit about the final
cause (national interests) motivating the U.S. claim. In
particular, the proclamation cited “the long range worldwide need for new sources of petroleum and other
minerals,” the need “to utilize or conserve these resources,”
and the State’s concomitant security interest in “keep[ing]
close watch over activities off its shore which are of the
nature necessary for utilization of these resources.” 103 Again,
subsequent States would also aver to many of the same
interests (though, as we will see below, States would also
use the Proclamation to justify preexisting claims). 104

Gulf Contiguous to the Coasts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 22 LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11 1951), [hereinafter, Saudi Declaration]; Abu
Ihabi noted that “valuable resources underlie parts of the Persian Gulf
off the coasts of Abu Dhabi and it has become increasingly possible to
utilize such submerged resources.” Proclamation with respect to the seabed
and the subsoil of the high seas of the Persian Gulf (June 10 1949), 23 LAWS
AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11 1951), [Hereinafter, Abu Ilhabi Declaration].
Similar statements were made by other Arab States under the Protection
of the United Kingdom, including Ajman, Bahrain, Dubai, Kuwait,
Qatar, Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaiwain; Mexico found
that, “growing need for States to conserve those natural resources which,
throughout the ages, and for various reasons, have been beyond their
control and have not been fully utilized.” Presidential Declaration with
respect to continental shelf [sic] (Oct. 29 1945), 13 LAWS AND REGULATIONS
OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1
(Jan. 11, 1951), [hereinafter, Mexican Declaration].
103 Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 99.
104 The Chilean Presidential Declaration considered that, the United
States, Mexico, and Argentina had claimed the continental shelf “within
the limits necessary to preserve for the said States the natural riches
belonging to them.” Presidential Declaration concerning continental shelf
[sic] (June 23 1947), 6 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE
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Third, Proclamation 2667 was a definitional
instrument, and therefore a formal cause of what would
eventually come to be the continental shelf regime. This is
most readily evident by the extent to which the Proclamation
changed the terms of international discourse regarding State
claims to submerged resources. Through the end of World
War II, most maritime powers (the United States and United
Kingdom in particular) recognized coastal State sovereignty
only over a three nautical mile band of sea immediately
adjacent to the coast. 105 This included subsea resource

HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951),
[hereinafter, Chilean Declaration]. Costa Rica stated that, (“the fishing
resources and the minerals existing under the submarine shelf, are of
capital importance for the nation and the State as food and industrial
wealth.” Maritime Fishing and Hunting Act (Sept. 28 1948), 9 LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951), [hereinafter, Costa Rican Declaration].
The Mexican government made a similar point - “the shelf contains
natural resources, liquid and gaseous minerals, phosphates, calcium,
hydrocarbons, etc., of inestimable value whose legal incorporation into
the national property is urgent and cannot be delayed” Mexican
Declaration, supra note 103 at 13; As did Peru, “the shelf contains certain
natural resources which must be proclaimed as our national heritage,”
Presidential Decree No. 781 Concerning Submerged Continental or Insular
Shelf (Aug. 1 1947), 16 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE
HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951),
[hereinafter Peruvian Declaration]. Similar statements were made by a
variety of Arab States under the Protection of the United Kingdom - “it is
desirable in the interests of protection, conservation and orderly
development that the exploitation of such resources should be properly
limited.” Abu Ilhabi Declaration, supra note 103, at 23.
105 See, e.g., SAYRE ARCHIE SCHWARTZRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF
TERRITORIAL SEAS (1972).
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rights. 106 Examples of subsea resource rights exercised
beyond three nautical miles were seen as historic,
prescriptive exceptions (e.g., the British claimed all of Palk
Bay in present-day Sri Lanka based on uninterrupted
sovereign claims by local rulers over chank fisheries beyond
three nautical miles). 107 The clearest sign that a change was
afoot came in 1942, when the United Kingdom and
Venezuela signed a treaty delimiting jurisdiction over the
Gulf of Paria. Subsequent to this treaty, both Venezuela and
the United Kingdom, on behalf of the Colony of Trinidad
and Tobago, annexed “the submarine areas of the Gulf of
Paria.” 108 Venezuela and the United Kingdom defined this
submarine area as “the sea-bed and sub-soil outside of the
territorial waters of the High Contracting Parties.”109
Proclamation 2667 and the Gulf of Paria documents are
certainly similar. They both address, for example, the seabed
and subsoil beyond the territorial sea. But Proclamation 2667
was definitional insofar as it (1) generalized the claim

106 An 1858 Act of the British Parliament, for example, affirmed the
Crown’s right to mines and minerals “under the open Sea below Lowwater Mark” off the coast of Cornwall. An Act to declare and define the
respective Rights of Her Majesty and of Her Royal Highness the Prince
of Wales and Duke of Cornwall to the Mines and Minerals in or under
Land lying below High-water Mark, within and adjacent to the County
of Cornwall, and for other Purposes 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. C. CIX,
107 163 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1923) col. 1418 (UK); PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE
LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 15–16 (1927).
108 Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order (Aug. 6 1942),
Laws of Trinidad and Tobago.
109 Treaty between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the
President of the United States of Venezuela relating to the Submarine
Areas of the Gulf of Paria, Feb. 26, 1942, U.K.-Venezuela, GR. BRIT. T.S.
NO. 10 (1942).
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beyond a specific location (here, the Gulf of Paria), (2) recast
the claim as one limited to resource rights, (3) extended the
claim to the entire continental shelf, which previously did
not have legal character, and (4) made the claim one of
natural right (i.e., jurisdiction emerged from the continental
shelf’s appurtenance to the coastal State, and did not require
a treaty to exist). As the sharp change in subsequent
international practice will show, these definitional shifts had
real bite.
c. RESPONSE
COMMUNITY

FROM

THE

INTERNATIONAL

At its core, the United States’ rules for the continental
shelf had three elements: (1) rights beyond the territorial sea
apply only as to the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf;
(2) the coastal State only enjoys jurisdiction and control over
the continental shelf; and (3) a State is entitled only to the
natural resources (i.e., gas and minerals) of the continental shelf.
From 1945 to 1950, ten Arab states (nine of them under
United Kingdom protection), nine Latin American States, the
Bahamas (through a United Kingdom Order-in-Council),
Iceland, and the Philippines all issued unilateral declarations
on the continental shelf. And while these declarations took
their inspiration from Proclamation 2667, they proffered
rules that contradicted each of the three tenets put forth by
the United States.
Geographically disadvantaged States (i.e., those with
no or a narrow continental shelf) differed from the U.S. rule
primarily regarding the first tenet. The Saudi Royal
Pronouncement, for example, does not mention the
continental shelf. It instead declares that “the subsoil and sea
bed of those areas of the Persian Gulf seaward from the
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coastal sea of Saudi Arabia but contiguous to its coasts, are
declared to appertain to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to
be subject to its jurisdiction and control.”110 Abu Dhabi (and
similarly situated Arab States under the protection of the
United Kingdom) similarly announced “the right of any
littoral state to exercise its control over the natural resources
of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to its coasts.” 111 Other
States were more creative. Chile, for example, laid claim
only to the continental shelf, but contended that, as a legal
concept, the continental shelf extended to depths the United
States considered beyond the pale. 112
A second group of States asserted that the continental
shelf was a zone of complete sovereignty, not mere
jurisdiction and control. This was the position of most Latin
American States. Argentina, for example, declared that it
was “the right of each nation to consider as national territory

Saudi Arabian Declaration, supra note 102, at 22.
Abu Ilhabi Declaration, supra note 102, at 23.
112 Chile, for example, declared that, “(1) The Government of Chile
confirms and proclaims its national sovereignty over all the continental
shelf adjacent to the continental and island coasts of its national territory,
whatever may be their depth below the sea”) Chilean Declaration, 6.
Costa Rica’s law stated that “National sovereignty is confirmed and
proclaimed in the whole submarine platform or continental and insular
shelf adjacent to the continental and insular coasts of the national
territory, at whatever depth it is found,” [emphasis added] Costa Rican
Declaration, 9. At the time, many geologists understood the continental
shelf to extend only to the point “where the sea covering the continental
shelf reaches a depth of 200 meters.” ARTHUR WATTS, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998 98 (vol. I, 1999). This criteria
would eventually be incorporated into Article 1 of the Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf.
110
111
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the entire extent of its . . . continental shel[f].” 113 Other States
extended the State’s sovereignty by implication. A United
Kingdom Order-in-Council, for example, “extend[ed] the
boundaries of the Colony of the Bahamas so as to include the
continental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the Colony.”114

Decree No. 14708 Concerning National Sovereignty over the Epicontinental
Sea and the Argentina Continental Shelf (Oct. 11 1946), 4 LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951), [hereinafter, Argentine Declaration].
Other Latin American States to declare sovereignty included Chile - “(1)
The Government of Chile confirms and proclaims its national
sovereignty over all the continental shelf adjacent to the continental and
island coasts of its national territory, whatever may be their depth below
the sea,” Chilean Declaration, supra note 105 at 6; Costa Rica - “National
sovereignty is confirmed and proclaimed in the whole submarine
platform or continental and insular shelf adjacent to the continental and
insular coasts of the national territory,” Costa Rican Declaration, supra
note 105 at 9; Peru – “1. To declare that national sovereignty and
jurisdiction can be extended to the submerged continental or insular
shelf adjacent to the continental or insular shores of national territory,
whatever the depth and extension of this shelf may be,” Peruvian
Declaration, supra note 104 at 16.
114 Also note provision from Honduras, “Article 4. ‘The limits of
Honduras and its territorial division shall be determined by law. The
submarine platform or continental and insular shelf, and the waters
which cover it, in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, at whatever
depth it may be found and whatever its extent may be, forms a part of
the national territory,” Congressional Decree No. 102 Amending the Political
Constitution (March 7 1950), 11 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF
THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951),
[hereinafter Honduran Declaration]; Nicaragua – “Article 5. The national
territory. . . also comprises . . . the continental shelf, the submerged
foundations (zocalos submarinos), the air space and the stratosphere,”
Political Constitution (Nov. 1 1950), 15 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE
REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan.
11, 1951), [hereinafter, Nicaraguan Declaration]; and Panama – “Article
113
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By leaving the precise legal status of the continental shelf
more ambiguous, these pronouncements presaged the
compromise that would eventually be codified in UNCLOS
(i.e., that a coastal State exercised “sovereign rights” only as
to the resources of the continental shelf).
Lastly, a number of States asserted that rights to the
continental shelf extended to the living resources in the
above water column. Some went so far as to claim
sovereignty over the superjacent water column, extending
their territorial reach many hundreds of miles beyond the
three nautical mile limit preferred by major maritime
powers. Chile, for example, proclaimed sovereignty “over
the adjacent seas within the limits necessary to preserve . . .
the natural riches belonging to them.” 115 Similar declarations
were made by Argentina, 116 Costa Rica, 117 Honduras,118

209. The following belong to the State and are of public use . . . (4) The
aerial space and the submarine continental shelf which appertain to the
national territory,” Constitution (March 1 1946), 15 LAWS AND
REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951), [hereinafter, Panamanian Declaration].
115 Chilean Declaration, supra note 104, at 6.
116 Argentina Declaration, supra note 113, at 5.
117 “Article 2. The rights and interests of Costa Rica are proclaimed over
the seas adjacent to the continental and insular coasts of the national
territory, whatever their depth, and to the extent necessary to protect,
conserve, and utilize the natural resources and wealth which exist or
shall come to exist on, in, or under said seas,” Costa Rican Declaration,
supra note 104, at 10.
118 “The submarine platform or continental and insular shelf, and the
waters which cover it, in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, at
whatever depth it may be found and whatever its extent may be, forms a
part of the national territory,” Honduran Declaration, supra note 114, at
11.
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Panama, 119 and Peru. 120 These more extensive claims were
based on an interest, shared with countries like Iceland, in
preserving near-abroad fish stocks for domestic use. 121 The
United States and other maritime powers, which depended
more heavily on far-seas fishing, naturally resisted this
extension of authority.
Taken together, this ferment of conflicting rules bear
out two of my theoretic conclusions. First, unintended
consequences are an important aspect of regime formation.
While Washington could not have foreseen the myriad ways
in which other States might leverage its redefinition of the
continental shelf, it was foreseeable that the nascent rules
would be contested. Second, States fully understand that
rules are inherently political, and work vigorously to
advance rules that best accord with their national interests.
By 1950, for example, the United States had demarched

“Article 3. For the purposes of fisheries in general, national jurisdiction
over the territorial waters of the Republic extends to all the space above
the sea bed of the submarine continental shelf,” Panamanian Declaration,
supra note 114, at 16.
120 “2. National sovereignty and jurisdiction are to be extended over the
sea adjoining the shores of national territory whatever its depth and in
the extension necessary to reserve, protect, maintain and utilize natural
resources and wealth of any kind which may be found in or below those
waters,” Peruvian Declaration, supra note 104, at 17.
121 ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 98, at 10; see also, “Article 1. The
Ministry of Fisheries shall issue regulations establishing explicitly
bounded conservation zones within the limits of the continental shelf of
Iceland, wherein all fisheries shall be subject to Icelandic rules and
control,” Iceland Law No. 44 Concerning the Scientific Conservation of the
Continental Shelf Fisheries (April 5 1948), 12 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF
THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1
(Jan. 11, 1951).
119
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Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Saudi Arabia, objecting to what
it saw as rules “unsupported by accepted principles of
international law.” 122
The period from 1950 to 1958 saw the proliferation of
agents contesting for supremacy in the creation of an
international regime for the continental shelf. The
International Law Commission, for example, was called
upon to draft proposals for the codification of a State’s right
to the continental shelf. The Commission did not engage in a
passive reflection of lex lata (the law as it currently exists).
The Commission rapporteur, JPA Francois, for example,
contended that, “It was more difficult to amend a law that
had already been established by States, than to guide it into
the desired channel by the enunciation of certain rules and
principles.” 123 The Commission was quite successful in this
regard. Articles 67 and 68 of its 1956 report to the General
Assembly became, verbatim, Articles 1 and 2(1) of the 1958
Geneva Convention. These Articles provided, respectively,
that (1) the continental shelf extended to a depth of 200

Regarding Chile, Argentina, and Peru, the United States objected to
proclamations of “national sovereignty . . . over the continental shelf and
over the seas adjacent to the coast” given that they fail “with respect to
fishing, to accord appropriate and adequate recognition of the rights and
interests of the United States in the high seas off the coast”) JOHN NOYES,
ERIK FRANCKX, & KRISTEN JURAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA 519 (2d ed., 2014). Regarding Saudi Arabia, the United States
objected to “All provisions to the effect that the coastal sea, i.e., the
marginal sea, of the Kingdom extends seaward of a belt of three nautical
miles along its coast or around its islands,” ALI A. EL-HAKIM, THE
MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 215 (1979).
123 Int’l Law Comm’n, Yearbook Vol. I: Law of the sea – regime of the
high seas 66th Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.66, at 215, (July
12 1950).
122
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meters or where “the depth of the superjacent waters admits
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas”
and (2) “The coastal State exercises . . . sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring [the continental shelf] and
exploiting its resources.” 124 It’s not that these provisions
were uncontested. Many States, including the United States,
objected to the International Law Commission’s
formulations during the Geneva Convention negotiations.125
But a combination of being the first to get a crack at devising
a compromise text, as well as accurately understanding the
verbiage States on both sides would be willing to accept,

Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission
covering the work of its eighth session, 23 April-4 July 1956, U.N. Doc.
A/3159, at 296–97 (Nov. 1956).
125 See, e.g., statements by Argentina - “it was a pity that the Commission
was reluctant to accept the principle of sovereignty of the coastal State
over the continental shelf,” U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Official Records Volume VI Fourth Committee (Continental Shelf) Summary
records of meetings and Annexes, 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/42; China “the term ‘sovereign rights’ in article 68 should be replaced by ‘rights of
control and jurisdiction’”) Id., at 4; Denmark - “it would prefer the words
‘sovereign rights’ in article 68 to be replaced by ‘control and jurisdiction’;
any reference to sovereignty, even if followed by a restrictive clause,
might cause difficulties during international armed conflicts or with
regard to scientific research”) Id., at 13; Chile – “the best course would be
to recognize the sovereignty of the coastal State over the continental shelf
and then attempt to specify the status of the superjacent waters,” Id., at
16; Italy - “it was incorrect to speak of the coastal State exercising
sovereign rights over the continental shelf, as did article 68,” Id.; United
States - “In order to make it clear that the waters above the continental
shelf were not affected, the United States delegation would like to see the
word ‘sovereign’ deleted, while agreeing to the retention of the word
‘rights’,” Id., at 20.
124
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powerfully affected the final regime that, largely, exists
today.
d. TAKEAWAYS: THE CONTINENTAL SHELF
CRITICAL REALISM

AND

In the end, how well were United States interests
served by unilaterally asserting jurisdiction and control over
the continental shelf in 1945? By almost any metric, very
well. The regime for the continental shelf was restricted to
the subsoil and seabed of the ocean floor. Tellingly,
Proclamation 2667 did not provide precise boundaries for
the extent of the continental shelf, which over time changed
with improved technology. Coastal State rights were
restricted to natural resources, which included mineral and
non-living resources as well as “sedentary species.” This is
largely in line with the original proclamation, which
suggested that a State only had rights to petroleum and
minerals. And codified international law came to reject the
contention that a State exercises sovereignty over the
continental shelf. 126
From a theoretic perspective, we can identify all four
of our critical realist causes in this story. A contest of
interests characterized the entire regime-building process,
motivating States to advance or stymie the rules first
proffered by the United States (final cause). The United
States, as the predominant maritime power throughout this
period, had significant capacity to induce other States to

Any difference one might impute into “sovereign rights” versus
“jurisdiction and control” has mattered little insofar as the actual practice
of States is concerned.
126
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accept its version of the rule (material cause). It is important
to note, however, that military might did not allow
Washington to impose its view on other States (or even the
International Law Commission). The United States actively
engaged with other States after the Proclamation was issued,
objecting to practices that were contrary to its interests and
actively participating in negotiations leading up to the 1958
Geneva Convention (effective cause). Finally, and most
importantly, the United States redefined a geographical
entity that, previously, had little monetary or security value.
None of the subsequent jockeying over language or
particular interests would have mattered without that first,
crucial step.
We can derive three policy lessons from this case
study. First, rules are not created in a vacuum. The
Proclamation’s ingenuity was in its ability to harness
opportunities presented by changing technology and
recasting preexisting international practice to better accord
with U.S. national interests. Exceptional entitlements to
chank beds and the division of the seabed in the Gulf of
Paria could easily have been recast in terms of absolute
sovereignty over the continental shelf (ala Chile, Argentina,
etc.). Second, domestic legal action does not need to apply to
extraterritorial agents to have an international effect or to
create an international regime. The Proclamation does not
purport to bind any entity other than the United States,
although all exercises of jurisdiction are necessarily
exclusionary. Policymakers should not cabin themselves,
therefore, to policy solutions that focus on effective
causation (i.e., acting directly on other agents). Finally,
domestic action was only the opening gambit in a whole-ofgovernment approach to regime creation. The United States
paired domestic legal action with a robust campaign of
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international engagement, ranging from bilateral demarches
to participation in formal, international negotiations. This
multi-pronged strategy is essential when there is more leadtime between domestic action and international codification,
as will be seen in the case of international corruption.
e. BRIBERY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was
enacted by President Jimmy Carter in 1977, and was the first
piece of domestic legislation to criminalize giving bribes to
foreign officials. It was followed 20 years later by the
OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations’
Convention Against Corruption (CAC) in 2003. Since 2003, a
number of States have enacted domestic anti-bribery statutes
in furtherance of these international obligations. For our
purposes, this has most notably included the United
Kingdom’s 2010 Bribery Act.
This section will trace the causal chain from
Watergate, through the FCPA, to the modern, increasingly
dense international anti-bribery regime. This history will
show the active role that Congress can play in creating
international legal regimes and the utility of pairing
domestic action with international engagement.
f. From Watergate to the FCPA
In the widening wake of Watergate, Senator Frank
Church led a less well-known Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations that investigated U.S. corporate
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political contributions to foreign governments. 127 The
subcommittee’s investigations sparked a series of revelations
that seriously destabilized governments friendly to the
United States. Many of the earliest revelations centered
around Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, an important
American defense manufacturer. The Italian Communist
Party, for example, almost came to power after it was
discovered that the former Chief of the Italian Air Force
received $1.6 million in bribes from Lockheed. 128 Japanese
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was forced to step down, and
subsequently arrested, for accepting $1.7 million from
Lockheed. 129 Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, consort of
the Queen, had to resign his official posts after receiving $1.1
million in Lockheed payoffs. 130 But Lockheed was far from
the only American corporation that bribed foreign officials.
By 1977, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had
uncovered 300 instances in which U.S. companies bribed
foreign officials, to the tune of at least $300 million. 131 Gulf

David Leigh & Rob Evans, The Lockheed scandal, THE GUARDIAN (June
8, 2007), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/08/bae35.
128 Italians Arrest An Ex-Air Chief, N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 1976),
http://www.nytimes.com/1976/03/23/archives/italians-arrest-anexair-chief-general-fanali-charged-in-lockheed.html; Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602, before the Subcommittee
on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 173 (1977) (statement of Representative
Stephen Solarz).
129 Japan Arrests 17th Official in Lockheed Bribe Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21,
1976), http://www.nytimes.com/1976/08/21/archives/japan-arrests17th-official-in-the-lockheed-bribe-scandal.html.
130 Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra note 128, at 172.
131 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearings on S. 305, before the Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 1 (1977) (opening
127
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Oil, for example, illegally contributed $4 million to the ruling
South Korean Democratic Republican Party’s campaign war
chest. 132 General Telephone lost out on an Indonesian
telecommunications contract after the Hughes Aircraft
Company, allegedly, agreed to pay $40 million in bribes. 133
These reports led to a widespread belief that the
public was loosing faith in American capitalism. Senator
William Proxmire, for example, stated that, “Public
confidence in the business community, the heart of our free
enterprise system, has been seriously affected by these
revelations.” 134 Secretary of the Treasury Michael
Blumenthal attested that, “the Carter Administration

statement of Senator Proxmire). The exact amount of money tendered in
bribes is disputed. Professor Nicholas Wilfson, in his Statement before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, testified
that, “More than 300 corporations have admitted to the payment of more
than $400,000,000 in questionable payments.” Id., 215. On the other end
of the spectrum, Representative Robert Eckhardt, Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, stated that, “Since 1974,
approximately 200 American corporations have admitted making
questionable foreign payments exceeding $300 million.” Hearings on H.R.
3815, supra note 128 at 1. Notwithstanding these numerical discrepancies,
the scale of this corruption is striking ($300 million in 1977 was
approximately $1.2 billion in 2017).
132 Hearings on H.R. 3815 (statement of Dr. Gordon Adams), supra note
128, at 28.
133 Seymour Hersh, Hughes Aircraft Faces Allegation that it Used Bribery in
Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1977. Hughes Aircraft Company denied the
allegations. The Export-Import Bank, a U.S. Government entity,
eventually provided $50 million in guaranteed loans to Hughes “despite
knowledge of the allegations of a payoff and conducted no inquiry into
the allegations.” Id.
134 Hearings on S. 305, supra note 131, at 1.
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believes that it is damaging both to our country and to a
healthy world economic system for American corporations
to bribe foreign officials.” 135 Revelations of untoward
corporate conduct generated other domestic and foreign
policy concerns. SEC Chairman Roderick Hills wrote that
bribery’s greatest ill was “the defiance or circumvention of
the system of corporate accountability on which the
securities laws – and indeed our system of mass capital
formation – rest.” 136 Representative Michael Harrington
noted how “Both Chilean President Allende and Venezuelan
President Perez broke off talks with U.S. officials on
compensation for nationalized property when they learned
of corporate payments.” 137
These domestic and international policy concerns
motivated the Senate and House to pass the FCPA by the
end of 1977. For our purposes, the FCPA has three relevant
parts. Section 102 mandated accounting practices such that
publicly traded corporations would have internal accounting
controls sufficient “to provide reasonable assurances” that
transactions are executed pursuant management’s general or
specific authorization. 138 Sections 103 and 104 provide that

Id., at 67.
Id., at 121.
137 Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra note 129, at 169.
138 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (“(2)
Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section
12 of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant
to section 15(d) of this title shall— (A) make and keep books, records,
and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and (B) devise
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that— (i) transactions are executed in
accordance with management’s general or specific authorizations”).
135
136
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publicly traded corporations and other U.S. “domestic
concerns,” respectively, would not provide bribes to foreign
officials, political parties, or other persons when there is
reason to know that all or part of the bribe would be
conveyed to a foreign official, political party, or candidate.139

More specifically, both §103 and §104 provided that it is unlawful “to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay,
or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to— (1) any
foreign official for purposes of— (A) influencing any act or decision of
such foreign official in his official capacity, including a decision to fail to
perform his official functions; or (B) inducing such foreign official to use
his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to
affect or influence any act or decision of such government or
instrumentality, in order to assist . . . in obtaining or retaining business
for or with, or directing business to, any person; (2) any foreign political
party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office for
purposes of— (A) influencing any act or decision of such party, official,
or candidate in its or his official capacity, including a decision to fail to
perform its or his official functions; or (B) inducing such party, official, or
candidate to use its or his influence with a foreign government or
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such
government or instrumentality, in order to assist . . . in obtaining or
retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person; or (3)
any person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a
portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or
promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign
political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political
office.” Id.
Foreign officials include “any officer or employee of a foreign
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such
government or department, agency, or instrumentality. Such term does
not include any employee of a foreign government or any department,
139
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Congress recognized that the FCPA would both extend to
non-U.S. citizens and have extraterritorial reach. The
conference report, for example, states that “the conferees
determined that foreign nationals or residents otherwise
under the jurisdiction of the United States would be covered
by the bill in circumstances where an issuer [of stock] or
domestic concern engaged in conduct proscribed by the
bill.” 140 Similarly, the House Report noted that the definition
of “domestic concern” was constructed such that it would
“reach not only all U.S. companies other than those subject
to SEC jurisdiction, but also foreign subsidiaries of any U.S.
corporation.”141 This is, of course, in addition to the fact that
companies publicly traded on U.S. exchanges do not
necessarily have their principal place of business in the
United States. 142
The FCPA, however, was always understood to be
one prong of a multidimensional strategy for combating

agency, or instrumentality thereof whose duties are primarily ministerial
or clerical.” Ibid., §103A(b)
Domestic concerns are defined as “(A) any individual who is a citizen,
national, or resident of the United States; or (B) any corporation,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust,
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized
under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or
commonwealth of the United States” Id., §104(d).
140 H.R. Rep. No. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).
141 Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra note 129, at 12.
142 In 2015, for example, 923 non-U.S. companies representing 53
jurisdictions filed reports with the SEC due to their listing on U.S.
exchanges. U.S. SECURITY AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, MARKET SUMMARY
(2015),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml.
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bribery of government officials. President Carter’s signing
statement noted that “These efforts . . . can only be
successful in combating bribery and extortion if other
countries and business itself take comparable action.
Therefore, I hope progress will continue in the United
Nations toward the negotiation of a treaty on illicit
payments.” 143 Secretary Blumenthal was more specific in
testimony before the Senate. He noted that the Carter
Administration had proposed a treaty that would (1) enforce
a State’s criminal laws, (2) facilitate information exchanges to
aid enforcement, and (3) provide uniform disclosure
requirements. 144 Blumenthal also highlighted the 1976
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which,
though non-enforceable, stated that corporations should not
render bribes to public officials. 145 The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers,
though unsupportive of the FCPA, echoed these calls for
international negotiations. 146 More interestingly, certain U.S.

Jimmy Carter, Signing Statement,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7036.
144 Hearing on S. 305 (statement by Sen. Blumenthal), supra note 131 at 69.
145 Hearing on S. 305 (Sen. Blumenthal colloquy with Sen. Tower), supra
note 131 at 103.
146 Hearing on S. 305 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce statement for the
record), supra note 131 at 187 (“The Chamber endorses the efforts of the
U.S. Government to bring about a treaty in this area under the auspices
of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)”); Id.
(National Association of Manufacturers statement for the record), 208
(“The negotiation of an international agreement to eliminate improper
payments worldwide would help assure that U.S. industry is not placed
at a competitive disadvantage by unfair foreign practices as well as place
world commerce on a better, market oriented trade and investment
basis”).
143
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Government officials were quite strategic about how the
FCPA might be leveraged internationally. Senator Harrison
Williams, for example, argued that “An affirmative action by
our Government will facilitate, what I believe is generally
agreed is necessary, an international solution. Once the bill
becomes law our Government will be in a position to argue
forcefully, with integrity and credibility, for bilateral and
multilateral agreements.” 147 SEC Chairman Roderick Hills
similarly noted that, “If we had treaties executed with the
Germans, Dutch, Italians, Japanese, the other major
industrial countries, we could practically, it seems to me,
wipe out the temptation to substitute competitive bribery for
fair competition.” 148
g. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and
Beyond
These statements turned out to be quite prescient, albeit
two decades too early. In the intervening years, American
industry became convinced that the FCPA, as a unilateral
measure, was hurting its international competitiveness.
President Bill Clinton suggested as much in a letter to the
Senate, “Since the enactment in 1977 of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA), the United States has been alone in
specifically criminalizing the business-related bribery of
foreign public officials.” 149 This frustration had first peaked

Hearing on S. 305, supra note 131, at 2.
Id. at 114.
149 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting
Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Officials in International
Business Transactions, Adopted At Paris on November 21, 1997, by a
Conference held under the Auspices of the Organization for Economic
147
148
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in 1988, when Congress directed the executive to more
actively pursue an OECD convention against bribery
modeled after the FCPA. 150 Three factors appear to have
motivated a change in European and Japanese positions
against such action. First, American business, led by General
Electric’s General Counsel Fritz Heimann, organized
Transparency International to reshape the international
conversation around bribery. 151 The United States, even in
the early days of the post-Cold War era, was limited in the
extent to which it could name and shame corporations
closely linked to its alliance networks in Europe and Asia.
Second, a series of domestic political scandals in Europe
mobilized domestic audiences to be more accepting of an
international, supply-side bribery treaty. 152 Lastly,
capitalizing on these revelations, reports indicate that the
Clinton Administration had threatened to publicly disclose
the names of OECD corporations that had engaged in
bribery. 153
It is remarkable how similar the Bribery Convention
is to the FCPA, notwithstanding the fact that they are
separated by over two decades. The State Department’s

Cooperation and Development (OECD). Convention Signed in Paris on
December 17, 1997, by the United States and 32 Other Nations, Treaty
Doc 105-43, 105th Cong. (1998), III [hereinafter, Letter of Transmittal].
150 Id.
151 Elizabeth Spahn, Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: from the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the
U.N. Convention Against Corruption, 1 INDIANA INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 23
(2013): 4-5; Edmund Andrews, 29 Nations Agree to Outlaw Bribing Foreign
Officials: Ratification is Required, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Nov. 21, 1997).
152 Spahn, supra note 151, at 6.
153 Id.

2018

DOMESTIC LAW, INT’L REGIMES

53

Letter of Submittal for the Bribery Convention identifies
only three points of departure, two of which actually went
beyond the FCPA’s requirements. First, the OECD
Convention covers bribes by “any person” not just issuers of
securities or directors of “domestic concerns.” 154 This
required the United States to expand its jurisdiction to
include foreign nationals in the United States, as well as U.S.
citizens operating outside the United States. 155 Second,
Article 1(4) of the OECD Convention expands the definition
of foreign public officials to include “any official or agent of
a public international organization,” incorporating
supranational organs like the European Community into the
anti-bribery framework.156 The only substantive way in
which the OECD Convention did not meet FCPA standards
related to foreign political parties or party officials. In many
OECD countries, foreign contributions to domestic political

154 Letter of Transmittal, supra note 150, at VI (“to comply fully with the
Convention, which covers bribes by ‘any person,’ the United States will
have to expand the scope of the FCPA to encompass bribes paid by
foreign persons who are not affiliated with issuers that have securities
registered under the Exchange Act”).
155 Id., at VII (“To implement fully the Convention, the United States will
have to expand the FCPA to encompass acts within its territory by other
foreign persons. The United States also proposes to assert jurisdiction
over the acts of U.S. persons outside the United States.”).
156 Id., at VI (Paragraph 17 of the Commentaries notes that public
international organizations “include[]any international organization
formed by states, governments, or other public international
organizations, including a regional economic integration organization
such as the European Community. The FCPA does not cover bribery of
officials of ‘public international organizations.’”).
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parties continue to be legal. 157 The State Department noted,
however, that the Convention covers “business-related
bribes to foreign public officials made through political
parties or party officials, as well as bribes directed by
corrupt foreign public officials to political parties or party
officials.” 158
Additional steps have been taken to strengthen this
nascent international anti-bribery regime since the OECD
Convention entered into force in 2009. The United Nations
CAC, for example, entered into force in 2005, focusing on
demand-side prohibitions of corruption. 159 183 countries are
States-Parties to the CAC, though enforcement of its
provisions varies widely. In 2010 the United Kingdom
passed the Bribery Act, which in certain respects imposes
even stricter anti-bribery requirements than the FCPA. For
example, the Act prohibits facilitation payments, meaning
that money paid to government clerical staff to expedite
paperwork would also be prohibited. 160

For example, it was only in 2017 that Australia began to consider
legislation prohibiting foreign donations to political parties. Jonathan
Pearlman, Australia bans foreign donations to political parties
after+China+controversy,+THE+TELEGRAPH+(Dec.+5,+2017),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/05/australia-bans-foreigndonations-political-parties-china-controversy/.
158 Letter of Transmittal, supra note 149, at VI.
159 Spahn, supra note 151, at 31.
160 Id.
157
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Unlike the continental shelf, U.S. policymakers were
better attuned to the fact that the FCPA could lay the
foundation for an international anti-bribery regime. Dr.
Gordon Adams, Director of Military Research at the Council
on Economic Priorities, testified during a House hearing
that, “One purpose of [the FCPA] is to set an example which
other countries will hopefully follow.” 161 Dr. Adams also
argued that the FCPA would allow “the U.S. Government . .
. participating in international talks on this issue [to have] a
clear, strong policy opposing such practices, giving it a
leadership position rather than that of being a reluctant
participant.” 162 The critical realist framework allows us to
more fully appreciate the causal mechanisms that allowed
the United States to be so successful in crafting an
international anti-bribery regime.
From the perspective of material causation, we must
acknowledge the extent to which the United States’
economic supremacy, particularly in the immediate
aftermath of the Cold War, allowed it to instantiate antibribery rules. In 1977, when the FCPA was adopted, U.S.
GDP was more than twice that of Japan, the second largest
economy at the time, and nearly four times that of Germany,
the third largest economy. 163 Nearly exactly the same was

Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra note 129, at 37.
Id.
163 WORLD BANK, Data,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2016&l
ocations=US-JP-GB-CN&start=1977&year_low_desc=true.
161
162
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true in 1998 when the Bribery Convention was adopted.164
United States dominance in terms of market capitalization is
even more striking. In 1977 the market capitalization of U.S.
listed domestic companies was almost 1.5 times greater than
that of all other countries for which the World Bank
currently has data. 165 By 1998 it still just exceeded that of all
other countries combined. 166 In terms of capitalization,
liquidity, and diversification, U.S. stock markets are
consistently the most attractive for public corporations
seeking to raise capital. 167 This structural supremacy aided
the United States, here, in two ways. First, it extended the
FCPA’s reach, since amending the Securities Exchange Act
allowed anti-bribery prohibitions and accounting standards
to be applied to all firms publicly traded in the United
States. The FCPA would have been much less influential if
American
stock
exchanges
were
less
important
internationally. Second, financial supremacy gave the United
States more leverage in creating international rules. Even
amongst OECD countries, the United States far outstripped
any other State in terms of economic prowess. The material
cause, therefore, significantly explains why the United States
was able to craft an international anti-bribery regime that
accorded with its interests.

WORLD BANK, Data,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2016&l
ocations=US&start=1998&year_low_desc=true.
165 WORLD BANK, Data,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?end=2016&l
ocations=US&start=1977&year_low_desc=true.
166 Id.
167 Why the U.S. Market, CHARLES SCHWAB,
http://www.schwab.com.hk/public/hk/us-investing/why_the_us.
164
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The FCPA was less of a revolutionary, definitional act
(formal causation) than Proclamation 2667 on the continental
shelf. Even in 1977, many States had laws against bribery,
and popular opposition to corruption were widely shared in
a variety of States. Instead, the FCPA acted as a formal cause
of the current international anti-bribery regime in two, more
limited ways. First, it recast the fight against corruption as a
supply-side problem. While criminal prohibitions on
receiving bribes were relatively commonplace, States had
not previously contemplated criminalizing giving bribes.
This freed up a degree of extraterritorial enforcement that
would not have been possible if corruption were only be to
understood as a demand-side problem. It would be a stark
imposition against comity for the United States, for example,
to exert jurisdiction over a foreign government official
accused of taking bribes. Indicting the U.S. held company
that provided the bribe, however, less directly threatens
another State’s sovereignty. Second, the FCPA as a text
provided an outline for the OECD Convention. As
evidenced by the State Department’s Letter of Submittal, the
OECD Convention was so similar in substance that few U.S.
domestic legislative changes were needed.
The effective and final causes of the OECD Convention are
readily apparent from statements made on the record both
in 1977 and 1998. Both the executive and legislative branches
were explicit in their desire to persuade European and Asian
allies to adopt U.S. anti-bribery rules. Non-State agents also
played a role – Transparency International and the American
business community more broadly were essential in
pressuring the U.S. Government to force international action
and shaming other States where bribery was taken less
seriously. Indications that the Clinton Administration was
willing to disclose unsavory deals in OECD member States
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shows the extent to which coercion played an integral role in
the creation of the anti-bribery regime. The final causes
(national interests) underlying these rules are also clear.
Congress wanted to restore faith in capitalist systems and
create a level playing field, based on quality and actual price,
for economic competition. The lack of normative
contestation between States over the U.S. rules may indicate
that many developed States were aligned in pursuing these
interests. In this regard, the New York Bar Association may
have been proven correct when it wrote that, “Because the
membership of the OECD is comprised of only Western
developed countries, it has the advantage of making it easier
to achieve consensus among its members.” 168
Policymakers today can extract five lessons from the
FCPA. First, Congress has a role to play in creating
international legal regimes. The FCPA originated in
revelations stemming from the Church Subcommittee, and
its language was largely drafted by members of Congress.
Legislators, therefore, should think broadly as to the possible
international effects of even domestically oriented bills.
Second, the executive should think critically about how
international policies can be coordinated with domestic
action. From the beginning, the FCPA was understood to be
only one part of a whole-of-government strategy to combat
global corruption. Promised international action helped
assuage domestic concerns that U.S. firms would be
disadvantaged by the FCPA. By the same token, the FCPA’s
existence allowed the United States to better publicly
pressure other OECD States and impose anti-bribery rules
on non-U.S. firms listed on American exchanges. Third, and

168

Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra note 129, at 102.
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relatedly, policymakers should think of cross-national
linkages as an element of national power. Here, the fact that
the United States was a financial nexus for multinational
corporations allowed the FCPA to have outsized
international effect. Non-State agents can be powerful
conduits of domestic rules to other jurisdictions, creating
expectations about rules of the road that become sticky, or at
least the basis for international negotiations. Similarly,
fourth, venue matters. Given the unequal global distribution
of economic power, a United Nations treaty on supply-side
bribery was less important than a convention between States
that account for the lion’s share of international economic
activity. Of course, this does not discount the importance of
universally shared standards – China, for example, is not a
party to the Bribery Convention and accounts for a
substantial and increasing share of global investment. Lastly,
unilateral domestic action can be costly. By the late 1980s
there was a consensus in the business community that
unilateral adherence to the FCPA made U.S. firms less
competitive.169 Rules, if adhered to, necessarily limit the
universe of possible actions that agents may permissibly
undertake. This imposes costs, which must be internalized
by some agent either domestically or internationally.
Policymakers need to balance these costs, and the

Note that some empirical research has tended to show that while
bribery may help win foreign contracts, it does not increase profits.
Daniel Fisher, Corporate Bribery May Bring In The Business, But
Not+Profits,+Study+Suggests,+FORBES+(April+11,+2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2016/04/11/corporatebribery-may-bring-in-the-business-but-not-profits-studysuggests/#31d841f3102e.
169
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distribution of cost, against the prospective gains to be had
in eventually crafting an international legal regime.
IV.

MODERN CHALLENGES:
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

DATA

PRIVACY

AND

The pace of technological change has only quickened
since regimes for the continental shelf and bribery were
developed in the 20th century. These technological
revolutions create new issues for which rules must be
applied. The two most pressing manifestations of this
phenomenon concern digital privacy and AI. In both, States
have already, or soon will, enact domestic rules that,
through the same causal mechanisms seen above, begin to
constitute international legal regimes.
Take, for example, the European Union (EU)’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). First, a
methodological note. Unlike our previous cases, the UE is a
supranational organization. As such, the GDPR story is
necessarily more complicated than that of the FCPA or
Proclamation 2667. 170 The fact that the EU is constituted
differently than the U.S. as an agent in international politics,
however, does not change the causal story presented here.
The GDPR creates an EU-wide set of standards for the
protection of personal data relating to online or real world

170 To present this causal story, for example, I don’t address the Member
State data privacy antecedents to EU-wide data protection (e.g., the fact
that the German State of Hesse enacted the country’s first data privacy
law in 1970). Online Privacy Law, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (June 5 2015),
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-privacy-law/germany.php.
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behavior conducted in the EU.171 Importantly, these
standards apply to the personal data of EU internet users
regardless of the location of the entity holding their data. In
this sense, the standards have significant extraterritorial
reach. 172 The GDPR defines personal data as “information
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”173
This understanding of personal data goes well beyond what
is protected under U.S. law, to include IP address, device ID,
and customer reference number. 174 Additionally, the GDPR
imposes restrictions on transferring personal data outside of
the EU. Data may only be transferred if (1) the European
Commission determines that the receiving jurisdiction
“ensures an adequate level of protection” consistent with the
GDPR, 175 (2) the processing entity has provided
“appropriate safeguards,” 176 or (3) the individual concerned
has provided specific consent for the transfer.177
Furthermore, the GDPR guarantees a number of privacy
rights to EU internet users, including mandatory, prompt
notification of data breaches likely to “result in a risk for the

EU General Data Protection Regulation – Key Changes, DLA PIPER,
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/focus/eu-data-protectionregulation/key-changes/.
172 Frequently Asked Questions about the incoming GDPR, GDPR PORTAL,
https://www.eugdpr.org/gdpr-faqs.html
173 General Data Protection Regulation 2016 O.J. (L119/1), Art 4(1)
[hereinafter, GDPR].
174 C. Ryan Barber, Apple Lawyer Warns of ‘Heavy’ Burden from Europe’s
New Privacy Rules, LAW.COM (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.law.com/sites/nationallawjournal/2017/10/19/applelawyer-warns-of-heavy-burden-from-europes-new-privacy-rules/.
175 GDPR, supra note 173, Art 45.
176 Id., at Art 46.
177 Id., at Art 49.
171
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rights and freedoms of individuals,” access to one’s personal
data, the ability to instruct an entity to erase one’s personal
data (consistent with the “right to be forgotten”), and the
ability to move one’s personal data from one processing
entity to another. 178 Together, these rights are at the heart of
the regulation’s purpose—to give citizens control over their
personal data.”
These rules, of course, have historical precedents. The
GDPR builds on a long history of European concern about
data privacy dating back to the OECD’s 1980 Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data. 179 The Guidelines, for example, similarly define
personal data as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable individual.” 180 Importantly, however, the
Guidelines are explicit in their concern about the effect of
national privacy laws on transborder data flows. The
Guidelines’ preface, for example, recommends, “that
Member countries endeavour to remove or avoid creating, in
the name of privacy protection, unjustified obstacles to
transborder flows of personal data.” 181 One year later, the
Council of Europe successfully negotiated the Convention
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic

GDPR Key Changes, EU GDPR Portal, last visited March 5, 2018,
https://www.eugdpr.org/key-changes.html.
179 How did we get here?, GDPR PORTAL, https://www.eugdpr.org/howdid-we-get-here-.html.
180 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal+Data,+ORGANISATION+FOR+ECONOMIC+COOPERATION+AND+DEVELOPMENT,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofp
rivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm#guidelines.
181 Id.
178
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Processing of Personal Data, which codified many of the
OECD’s recommendations. 182 There were hints, however,
that the EU was already gradually subverting some of the
OECD Guidelines’ business-friendly provisions. The 1981
Convention, for example, only provided that Member States
not impede the flow of personal data as between Member
States in the name of privacy.183 This change in emphasis
was made more clear in 1995 with Directive 95/46/EC “on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data.” 184
The Directive, while not creating uniform enforcement
across EU jurisdictions, expanded the rights of EU citizens to
control their data.185 Article 25 on cross-border data flows
was the clearest signal of the Directive’s pro-privacy stance
on cross-border transfer of personal data. It provides that
Member States must guarantee that transferred personal

Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, E.T.S. 108 (Jan. 10, 1985),
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/rms/0900001680078b37.
183 Id., at Art 12(2). Note, however, that States were allowed to derogate
from this principle with specific legislation regarding certain types of
more sensitive personal information.
184 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 1995
O.J. (L281), [hereinafter, Data Privacy Directive].
185 See, e.g., Id., at Section IV (Within this section, for example, Article 10
requires that “Member States shall provide that the controller or his
representative must provide a data subject from whom data relating to
himself are collected with” information concerning the identity of the
controller (i.e., the corporate point of contact for privacy matters), the
purpose for which data is being processed, and what the data is being
used for.).
182
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data will enjoy an “adequate level of protection” outside the
EU. In making this adequacy determination, the Directive
specifically instructs Member States to consider, inter alia,
“the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the
third country in question and the professional rules and
security measures which are complied with in that
country.” 186 This adequacy framework is a far cry from the
OECD’s 1980 trade oriented support for the free movement
of data, and shows the extent to which the EU has, through
internal policies, changed the rules regarding data privacy.
GDPR rules have already had a significant effect on
data privacy practices in non-EU jurisdictions. Google, for
example, has stated that it is “working hard to prepare” for
the GDPR and that, as a data processor, it “will update our
agreements to reflect the obligations of controllers and
processors and offer data-processing agreement where
required in time for May 2018.” 187 Google also cites its
membership in the EU-US Privacy Shield as a sign of its
adherence to GDPR rules on the cross-border transfer of
personal data. 188 Privacy Shield is a set of privacy standards
and protocols, negotiated and implemented by the U.S.
Department of Commerce and European Commission, “to
provide companies on both sides of the Atlantic with a
mechanism to comply with data protection requirements,”

Id., at Art 25
We are committed to complying with applicable data protection laws,
GOOGLE,
https://privacy.google.com/businesses/compliance/#?modal_active=n
one.
188 Id.
186
187
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including the GDPR. 189 Importantly, however, the European
Commission must review Privacy Shield, and the U.S.’s
implementation of it, annually to determine whether it
continues to adequately protect EU citizen privacy. The
Commission renewed Privacy Shield’s mandate in its first
review (October 2017), but made a number of notable
recommendations. The Commission stated that it “would
welcome if [the] U.S. Congress would consider favourably
enshrining in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act the
protections for non-Americans offered by Presidential Policy
Directive 28.” 190 The Commission also urged the Department
of Commerce to undertake regular compliance checks and
actively search for companies falsely claiming to participate
in Privacy Shield. These recommendations carry real weight
– as of this first review, 2,400 U.S. companies have signed up
for Privacy Shield, including some of the largest U.S. tech
firms (e.g., Google, Facebook, and Microsoft). 191 In 2015, the
United States had to scramble when the European Court of
Justice found that a previous, less restrictive cross-border
data regime (Safe Harbor) was inadequately protective of

U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE INT’L TRADE ADMIN., Privacy Shield Program
Overview, https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview.
190 First Annual Review of the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
(Oct.
18,
2017),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-17-3967_en.htm. PPD-28 states that, as a matter of U.S.
policy, U.S. surveillance activities must include appropriate safeguards
for the personal information of all individuals, regardless of their
nationality or residence.
191 Natasha Lomas, EU uses Privacy Shield review to press for reform of U.S.
foreign
surveillance
law,
TECHCRUNCH
(Oct.
18,
2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/18/eu-uses-privacy-shield-review-topress-for-reform-of-u-s-foreign-surveillance-law/.
189
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privacy.192 The economic fallout from a non-compliance
determination, therefore, gives the EU impressive leverage
to influence data privacy practices in the United States. 193
While we are far from a formal international legal
regime for data privacy, there are important causal
analogues to our prior case studies. In many ways, the
GDPR is most similar to our discussion of the FCPA. From
the perspective of material causation, the EU is leveraging its
outsized importance in the digital economy. As a combined
entity, its GDP is second only to that of the United States.194
Its population is greater than that of the United States 195 and
a greater share of its population uses the Internet. 196 In fact,
outside of China and India, the EU has more Internet users

U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE INT’L TRADE ADMIN., Welcome to the U.S.-EU
Safe Harbor, (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://2016.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018365.asp.
193 It is important to note, however, the potentially limited degree to
which these more privacy-oriented safeguards are generalized beyond
the data of EU citizens. Google, for example, notes that only EU users are
asked “for permission to use data to personalize ads.” GOOGLE, supra
note 189. Technology now allows more granular differentiation of users
by jurisdiction, potentially forestalling the expansion of EU-style privacy
protections to non-EU data subjects. This is especially true given the
extent to which GDPR data protection may impede the use of Big Data
for commercial purposes.
194 WORLD BANK, Data,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=E
U-US-CN&year_high_desc=true.
195 WORLD BANK, Data,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=EU-INCN-US.
196 WORLD BANK, Data,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=EUUS-CN, (As of 2016, 81% versus 76% for the United States).
192
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than any other jurisdiction. 197 This gives the EU incredible
influence over U.S. tech firms, who are strongly incentivized
to maintain access to this important market. The FCPA
similarly leveraged the United States’ unmatched status as a
locus of capital markets to instantiate anti-bribery rules.
From the perspective of formal causation, the GDPR (and its
antecedent directives) has literally redefined data privacy
and, perhaps more importantly, the balance to be struck
between privacy and free trade. Again, the FCPA also
explicitly created new definitions for bribery and changed
the balance of interests as between corruption and business
efficacy. The final causes (interests) underlying these
changes are readily apparent – the GDPR is explicitly placed
in a philosophical tradition regarding the right to privacy
extending from Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights 198 to Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. 199 The FCPA was similarly universalist in its
ambition, advancing a normative understanding that
corruption is undesirable. Given the degree to which GDPR

197 WORLD BANK, Data,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?year_high_des
c=true.
198 G.A. Res. 217A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks”).
199 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14, E.T.S. No. 5
(March 9, 1953), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/rms/0900001680063765 (“1. Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.”).
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has already redefined the data privacy space, even before
formal implementation, it is likely too late for the United
States to create an international data privacy regime that
would differ appreciably from the European model.
Regulation of AI is a more protean example of
international regime creation by domestic rulemaking.
China has embarked on a concerted, whole-of-government
effort to support and regulate AI. 200 China’s “New
Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan”
declares that China seeks to be at the forefront of AI
development by 2030. 201 This is being underwritten by an
unprecedented outlay of government funding, to the tune of
$1 billion in 2017 alone. 202 Importantly for our purposes, the
Chinese government also states that, “Laws and regulations
about AI should be formulated.” 203 It is unclear how quickly
such rules might be developed, or what their content might
be. But, only considering material causation, we can expect
that any Chinese rules will have important international
effects. China has almost twice as many Internet users as the

200 Elsa Kania, China Is On a Whole-of-Nation Push for AI. The US Must
Match It,+DEFENSEONE+(Dec.+8,+2017),
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/12/us-china-artificialintelligence/144414/.
201 THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, China issues
guideline+on+artificial+intelligence+development,+(July+20,+2017),
http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/07/20/content_281
475742458322.htm.
202 Yue Wang, Will the Future of Artificial Intelligence Look Chinese?, FORBES
(Nov.+6,+2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2017/11/06/will-the-future-ofartificial-intelligence-look-chinese/#4a173657fdcf.
203 THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, supra note
203.
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United States, many of whom use the Internet for far more of
their daily life than the average American. 204 This creates a
larger pool of data with which algorithms can be tested,
tweaked, and improved. As of 2016, the number of academic
papers on artificial intelligence published in China outpaced
that of the European Union, though it still has not matched
that of the United States. 205 The more China becomes a hub
for AI innovation, the greater influence its regulations in this
space will have on the international community. The Obama
Administration may have realized this insight in 2016, when
it released a report articulating principles for governing
AI. 206 Since 2016, however, little seems to have been done to
advance
these
principles either
domestically
or
internationally.
Unilateral action by the EU and China regarding data
privacy and AI yield important takeaways for U.S.
policymakers. The process of regime creation through
domestic legal processes is alive and well. Regardless of
whether other jurisdictions are overt in their attempts to
create international regimes, the causal parallels to our 20th
Century case studies show that recent domestic initiatives
have the potential to powerfully shape and create future,
formalized international regimes. The United States cannot
wait until formal negotiations, one day, begin on an

Louise Lucas, China seeks dominance of global AI industry, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/856753d6-8d3111e7-a352-e46f43c5825d.
205 Id.
206 NAT’L SCI AND TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH., Preparing for the
Future+of+Artificial+Intelligence+(Oct.+2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse
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international agreement (or norms or whatever new moniker
is used) regarding cross-border data flows, data privacy, or
AI. It will already have been too late. The contest over rules,
and therefore rule, is happening now.
V.

CONCLUSION

Rules, and the international regimes they constitute,
are powerful conduits for expressing and exercising national
interests. We see this recognized in the 2018 U.S. National
Defense Strategy, which decries increasing global disorder
“characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based
international order” 207 and calls for engaging with allies to
“defend[] freedom, deter[] war, and maintain[] the rules
which underwrite a free and open international order.”208
Given the importance of international regimes, it is
particularly unfortunate that the foreign policy community
has been operating with an impoverished understanding of
rule creation in international politics. Legal formalism has
created a deeply ingrained set of assumptions that prevent
policymakers from crafting international regimes that would
be best positioned to advance American interests. The above
case studies show that a different approach, recognizing the
role of domestic rulemaking, is available. And it has been
used before. We have seen how domestic legal enactments
are causal antecedents of the international regimes that

U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of
the United States of America
1,+https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
208 Id., at 8.
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currently govern the continental shelf and international
corruption. Indeed, the same tactics are being used right
now to begin constructing international rules around data
privacy and AI. Taken together, these case studies suggest
that all forms of critical realist causation (material, formal,
effective, and final) must be mobilized if the United States is
to compete in an increasingly fractured world.
This is not to say that domestic rulemaking is the
only, or always preferable, method for creating international
regimes. First, as the number of agents active in international
politics proliferates, the potential for unintended
consequences increases. A number of States, for example,
used President Truman’s proclamation on the continental
shelf to claim much broader maritime sovereignty. At that
time, there were only 51 other agents (UN Member States)
that could contest the United States’ position. 209 There are
currently 193 UN Member States. 210 Divining the causal
effects of domestic legislation on an international regime for
data privacy, therefore, has only become more difficult.
Relatedly, and second, the proliferation of agents in
international politics suggests that there will be more rule
fractionation before harmonization. Moreover, this
proliferation of contesting rules on any given issue is more
likely to be sticky as the relative distribution of power
between agents in international politics becomes more
diffuse. But the fact that effects have become more
indeterminate does not mean that the causal mechanisms

U.N., Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-unitednations-membership-1945-present/index.html.
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should be ignored. As we saw with the FCPA, a wellrounded strategy can pair domestic rulemaking with
international engagement over the course of decades to craft
an international regime that best advances a State’s interests.
Third, the strategy outlined in this paper has a bias towards
rulemaking. However, in some issue areas, and particularly
for status-quo powers, it may be in the State’s interest to
prevent the creation of new rules. For these States, it is
important to remember that rules (even if unspoken) always
exist. It is the job of these status quo agents, therefore, to
make the rules explicit. This can be achieved through
domestic legislation, executive proclamations, or other
public statements. Endorsing the status quo does not require
ceding the initiative.
Moreover, there have been a number of historical
scenarios in which it was advantageous to begin with
negotiations at the international level and not rely on prior
domestic legal enactments. The Antarctic Treaty and Moon
Treaty provide good case studies. In both, the international
community came together to decide that extraterrestrial
objects and the Antarctic should be removed from national
jurisdiction, and instead preserved for the benefit of all
humankind into perpetuity. A similar desire to restrict State
action underpinned the entire nuclear nonproliferation
regime. While addressing quite different policy spaces, these
areas of international law are similar in that there is a
collective action problem. It is not in the interest of any State
to unilaterally, as a matter of domestic regulation, limit their
territorial jurisdiction or discontinue developing nuclear
weapons. It is only when other agents, important in that
issue area, jointly agree to limit their freedom of action that
it is safe, as a matter of domestic practice, to enact restraints.
This suggests that the domestic-first strategy outlined in this
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paper would not be appropriate for issue sets in which the
policy objective is to limit a State’s capacity.
Taken together, these caveats combined with the
insights above suggest that policymakers should be mindful
of the following considerations when deciding whether to
use my domestic-first approach. First, do you aim to limit
State capacity, as opposed to expanding its jurisdiction or
ambit of authority? If so, domestic solutions are unlikely to
be helpful (unless your State is able to bear the costs of such
action for a potentially prolonged period of time, as was true
of the United States in the case of the FCPA). Second, how
materially capable is your State in this issue space? Given
the increasingly fractured landscape of international politics,
a State needs to be quite capable for domestic rules to have
real international effect. Otherwise, it may be more beneficial
to create a coalition of like-minded States to enact a similar
set of rules from the outset. Third, are you prepared to
manage the range of reasonably foreseeable reactions by
rivals? As discussed above, it is not possible to fully
anticipate the ways in which a given set of domestic rules
will be used by other agents contrary to one’s interests. But
that does not mean that it is impossible to game out likely
reactions (for example, the United States could have
reasonably foreseen that Latin American States would use
any opportunity to expand their claims to maritime
sovereignty). If the range of likely reactions cannot be
managed, it may be wise to modify the proposed rule set to
better accord with the interests of other. Or act in concert
with like-minded States from the beginning. Fourth, and
finally, is it domestically feasible to advance your proposed
rule set? The answer to this question will differ depending
on the issue space and current state of politics. For the
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United States, this issue is complicated by significant
bureaucratic coordination problems.
Within the executive branch, domestic and foreign
policies are designed by separate agencies using, largely,
separate staffs. Perhaps more insidiously, law in the
executive branch’s foreign policy bureaucracy is more often
treated as a compliance mechanism rather than a tool of
foreign policy. In Congress, committees that deal with
foreign relations or defense policy largely do not engage
with enacting laws that would have domestic effect (other
than supervision over or funding for their respective
agencies). Coordination between lawmaking in Congress
and foreign engagement by the executive is, if possible, even
more rare. Each of these silos must be bridged to formulate
innovative legal strategies that leverage domestic
rulemaking to create international regimes. Because as
international regimes become increasingly contested, it is a
great disservice to craft foreign policy with only half a
toolkit.

